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LUCIAN BEBCHUK, TIMOTHY FORDE, MICHAEL GARLAND,

HENRY HOPKINS,

PATRICK McGURN, AND JOHN OLSON

The $7 Trillion Question:
Mutual Funds & Investor Welfare

MUTUAL FUNDS & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
RICHARD BOOTH: This first afternoon panel is moderated by John Olson of Gibson Dunn in Washington. The title is "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance." We are going to talk about what mutual funds can do to help run
corporations, why they did not see Enron coming, and the like. John, take it away.
JOHN OLSON: Thank you very much, Richard. It's great to be here. I need to offer
a personal disclaimer at the outset. As some of you know, my firm is currently
suing the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (and I am on the briefs and papers), claiming that the SEC
exceeded its authority in mandating a nonexecutive chairman and a seventy-five
percent majority of independent directors on mutual fund boards. Anything I say
here today does not necessarily reflect the views of my colleagues at Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, and it certainly does not necessarily reflect the views of the Chamber
of Commerce. Fortunately, we are going to talk about mutual funds as an engine
for affecting corporate governance within investee corporations. I should also disclose, however, that I do work for the Business Roundtable, which has opposed the
shareholder-access rule' that Jack Bogle was extolling. But that will not stop me
from expressing my own views.
Let me introduce my fellow panelists. At my far left is Pat McGurn, who is a very
thoughtful and knowledgeable person. He is one of the top folks at Institutional
Shareholder Services [ISS] and has been there for a number of years. As you know,
ISS is the leading proxy advisory firm. Next to Pat is a Baltimorean, Henry Hopkins
of T. Rowe Price. Henry has been with Price for over thirty-two years and currently
serves as its chief legal counsel. He brings to this panel the perspective of someone
who manages funds and makes voting decisions on behalf of funds. Next to Henry
is Lucian Bebchuk, the William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Profes-

1. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8818, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003).
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sor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Lucian is a wellknown writer on topics of corporate governance and teaches similar subjects at
Harvard. On my far right is Tim Forde from the Investment Company Institute
[ICI]. Tim is in charge of strategic planning and research at the ICI, and is a good
student of what the trends are with respect to the mutual fund industry. He also
had a career on Capitol Hill before that and is a well-known person in Washington.
Next to Tim is Mike Garland, the corporate transactions coordinator for the AFLCIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations]. He advises them as to their investments and as to the positions they take on corporategovernance issues.
Our plan of attack for the next few minutes is to start with Mike. He will review
the shareholder vote-reporting rule2 and some research by the AFL-CIO regarding
the initial reports by mutual fund complexes on their voting policies and the actual
votes they have cast. Then we will turn the program over for a dialogue between
Henry Hopkins and Pat McGurn as to how people in the real world actually make
voting decisions, how fund managers vote, and how the leading advisory service
decides to make advice. What kinds of principles do they apply? What kinds of
criteria? What are they looking for, what are they thinking about, and what do they
think their effect ought to be? After that we will let Tim make some observations
about where the industry is going. Finally, Lucian will share with us some research
and writing he has done in the field-what this all means, does good governance
really have an effect, and does it make a difference? After that we will open it up to
questions and comments from the floor.
This has been a very active year with respect to corporate governance, as you
know. It has been active specifically with respect to mutual funds, both as to internal governance and as to the external responsibilities of funds. We now have in
place the reporting rule3 that Mike will discuss, and we are seeing its initial results.
That puts mutual fund voting in the sunlight. It is interesting to me that the rule
was pushed very, very hard by former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt against strong
opposition even within the Commission and from the industry. I am interested in
whether you have any observations as to whether Harvey was right or Harvey was
wrong. I happen to be a fan of Harvey's in many ways. He did a lot of things right,
because of which we are now seeing the benefits even though he is no longer at the
SEC. There is also, of course, a tremendous amount of emphasis being placed on
the mutual fund industry because of the various investigations that have been conducted relating to trading practices and the like. And although that does not directly affect the funds as participants in the corporate-governance process, it may
have an effect on their credibility as champions of corporate governance, sort of

2. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Jan.
31, 2003).
3. Id.
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"Physician, heal thyself."4 The SEC has proposed and, to some extent, adopted a
number of reforms. Among those is the rule I just mentioned that is being challenged by the Chamber of Commerce and additional disclosure standards of various kinds.
One of the questions we will want to think about is what kind of regulatory
change is going to put the "white hat" back on the mutual fund complexes and the
managers of those funds so that they again become credible advocates for good
governance for others. One of the problems that CalPERS [California Public Employees' Retirement System] has had in recent years as a governance advocate is that
its own governance credentials are suspect. The Wall Street Journal, which is suspicious of anything that changes the natural order of things, as determined by markets, in their view, has run a number of editorials attacking CalPERS for not taking
care of its own problems before telling the rest of the world how to discharge
responsibilities.' Is that a problem for a mutual fund industry under siege, or is
part of the solution for the fund industry to act responsibly as an engine of good
governance? I think that the shareholder-access rule is probably not going anywhere until after the makeup of the SEC is resolved after the election. Nonetheless,
the mere fact that it has been proposed is already affecting behavior.
Mike, let's talk about a rule that went into effect in August, this vote-reporting
rule, and what you think its effect has been.
MICHAEL GARLAND: Thank you, John. I appreciate the opportunity to share the
labor movement's perspective on mutual fund reform. For those of you who do not
know, the AFL-CIO is the federation of America's labor unions, and we represent
sixty national and international unions and their membership of thirteen million
working women and men. Union members invest both individually and through a
variety of benefit plans with over $5 trillion in assets, including $400 billion in
union-sponsored pension plans. While defined-benefit plans constitute the bulk of
these assets, more than six million union members invest in mutual funds, through
their defined contribution plans and as individual investors. So both the employment security and the retirement security of our members are very much dependent on the integrity of the capital markets. Our funds are truly long-term
investors, particularly the pension funds, because of their actuarial time horizons
and because more and more of the pension funds are invested in index funds. They
see exercising their rights as owners as the only way to influence long-term corporate performance.
The mission of the Office of Investment, where I work, is to promote the interest
of worker beneficiaries in the capital markets by supporting worker fund initiatives
to enhance corporate performance and governance and by advocating for effective

4. Luke 4:23 (King James).
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Calpers and Cronyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A18, and Editorial, Conflicted in
California, WALL ST. I., May 11, 2004, at A18.
VOL. 1 NO. 1 20o6

MUTUAL FUNDS & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

regulatory reform. One of the most significant reforms we fought for in the face of
intense fund industry opposition was the SEC rules adopted in January 2003, which
require mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes.6 We first petitioned the SEC for
these rules back in December 2000. In July 2002, after corporate scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco revealed how unregulated conflicts of interest can compromise the independence of the very people entrusted to protect investors, we again
called on the SEC to require mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes.
Where Sarbanes-Oxley sought to rein in the conflicts of interest that compromise the independence of outside auditors and corporate directors, and Eliot
Spitzer's global settlement sought to rein in the conflicts that drove investment
analysts to issue buy ratings on stocks that they thought were junk, we hoped that
the SEC would address the conflict that has led mutual fund companies to use their
enormous proxy voting power to act as rubber stamps for corporate management
rather than to promote the best interest of their mutual fund shareholders.
Mutual funds own twenty-three percent of U.S. corporate equity, so their proxy
votes on such issues as executive pay and board of director accountability can be
decisive. While mutual funds have a fiduciary duty to cast these votes in the best
interests of investors, they can also have an economic interest in voting with management, even if those votes are not in the interest of their investors. This conflict,
as John Bogle described, stems from the mutual fund companies' interest in selling
401(k) management services and other financial services to their portfolio companies, the same companies at which they are voting proxies on behalf of their investors. Fidelity [Investments], for example, earns half its operating income selling feebased services to corporate America.
The result is that mutual funds have wielded their enormous proxy-voting power
to ratify conflicted auditors and reelect entrenched boards of directors. Perhaps the
consequences of mutual funds' conflicted voting practices are most apparent, however, in the skyrocketing CEO pay over the past two decades. In 1980, CEO pay
stood at about forty-two times the average worker's pay. In 2003, CEO pay reached
301 times the average worker's pay. If you look back about two years ago, it peaked
at about 500 times. Thanks to the proxy-voting disclosure rule the SEC adopted in
January 2003, mutual fund companies must now do what investment firms that
manage private pension plans have long been required to do by the Department of
Labor [DOL]: tell their clients how they cast proxy votes on their clients' behalf.
The DOL requirement has allowed us to publish the AFL-CIO Key Votes Survey'
every year since 1997. We believe this is the first and only systematic review of how
investment managers cast their proxy votes. Last year's issue had over 150 invest-

6.
7.
15, 18,
8.
IN THE

17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-101, 275.206(4)-6(b) (2005).
Sarbanes-Oxiey Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
AFL-CIO OFFICE OF INVESTMENT, AFL-CIO KEY VOTES SURVEY: How INVESTMENT MANAGERS VOTED
2005 PROXY SEASON (2005), available at http://www.aflcio.org/proxyvotes.
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ment managers who we surveyed on about two dozen proxy votes. Conspicuously
absent, however, have been the mutual fund companies, because they did not have
to disclose how they voted.
To mark the first annual release of the mutual fund proxy votes on August 30, as
required by the new SEC rule, and to enable investors to evaluate and interpret
their fund's voting practices more easily, we prepared a special report evaluating
the 2004 proxy votes of the ten largest mutual fund families. 9 Specifically, we
looked at how these funds voted when presented with opportunities to curb pay
abuses at twelve S&P 500 companies with clearly excessive CEO pay and poor performance. The report includes eight shareholder proposals, covering such issues as
options expensing, golden parachutes, and performance-based pay. We also looked
at four management proposals seeking approval for excessive pay packages.
JOHN OLSON: Did our friends at T. Rowe Price get a passing grade?
MICHAEL GARLAND: I believe they received a fifty-eight percent.
JOHN OLSON: That's pretty good, huh?
MICHAEL GARLAND: They are actually the AFL-CIO's 401(k) managers. [laughter] We intend to talk to them about that fifty-eight percent at some point. We
chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffett, "The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation."° The report, titled Behind the Curtain," also highlights business relationships
between mutual fund firms and the twelve companies we looked at.
I will quickly summarize some of our findings. The most obvious and, in some
ways, surprising finding was the variation we found among the twelve fund families. The scores in the survey range from a high of 100% for American Century
[Investments] to a low of twenty percent for Putnam [Investments]. The other
eight funds or families are distributed relatively evenly between that twenty percent
and 100%.2 Fidelity, the nation's largest fund family, and the most vocal opponent
to proxy-vote disclosure, ranked ninth out of ten with a twenty-five percent score.
Fidelity voted against all eight of the shareholder proposals in which shareholders
sought to put in place reforms to rein in runaway pay. Fidelity also voted against
management on three of the four management plans, however. I think that had to
do with some of their guidelines with respect to dilution. Vanguard [Group], the
other leading opponent to proxy-vote disclosure ranked second in the survey with a
seventy-five-percent score. Vanguard was one of only two mutual fund families that
voted against all four management proposals seeking excessive executive
compensation.
JOHN OLSON: How do you decide what is excessive, Mike?
9.

AFL-CIO OFFICE OF INVESTMENT, BEHIND THE CURTAIN (2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/

corporatewatch/capital/upload/BehindtheCurtain.pdf.
10.

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2003).

11.
12.

See supra note 9.
Id. at 6.
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MICHAEL GARLAND: We have picked our companies by collecting research from
Institutional Shareholder Services [ISS], an independent proxy-voting service, and
Glass Lewis. Glass Lewis, in particular, issues grades for pay performance. The
grades pay for performance. So we collected research in advance of some of the
most egregious examples cited by these independent proxy-research firms. We
wanted to pick firms that were widely held, so we focused only on S&P 500 companies. We wanted to cover a range of issues that shareholder proposals seek to address, including options expensing, performance-based pay, and shareholder
approval of golden parachutes. We also included some management proposals
seeking shareholder approval for equity-compensation plans. In the report we include a write-up of each company, cite the independent research with respect to
why the particular issue the shareholders are voting on was important, and why we
believe (and why we believe most shareholders would agree) that there was an
opportunity to rein in what was excessive pay de-linked from performance. We
were not just going after big pay packages. We wanted to link it to companies where
there was high pay despite poor performance. In many cases these are the bottom
quartile or bottom quintile of the S&P 500 based on BusinessWeek rankings."
One shortcoming of the SEC rule is that it does not require mutual funds to
disclose their business relationships with portfolio companies. So in the report we
independently researched those relationships and found that, of the 104 proxyvoting decisions actually reported in the survey, twenty-five involved a mutual fund
adviser that had a business relationship with the portfolio company. Fidelity maintained the most business relationships (with eight of the twelve companies), followed by Capital Research and Management (which advises the American Funds
and had five), and Vanguard (which had four). We believe the widespread conflicts
of interest point to the need to enhance the SEC rule to require fund companies to
disclose business relationships with portfolio companies. We originally sought that
in the rule and were not successful.
There is reason to believe that at least one fund company, in an effort to restore
its reputation and establish best practice, may be moving in this direction. Shortly
after we released the report in the first week of September, the California treasurer,
Phil Angelides, CalPERS, and the California State Teachers' Retirement System
[CalSTRS] were in discussions with Putnam Investments. I believe that both
CalPERS and CalSTRS had fired Putnam in the wake of scandals at the firm. They
were in discussions with Putnam, which was interested in adopting a set of reforms
and disclosures that would help better protect mutual fund investors and help Putnam restore its reputation. As a result of issues raised in our report, Putnam, Angelides, CalPERS and CalSTRS issued a joint press release on September 23 reporting
that

13. Business Week Online S&P 500 Scoreboard, http://research.businessweek.com/scoreboard.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
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Putnam also has agreed to undertake a special review of mutual fund proxy
policies and procedures regarding executive compensation, to be completed
prior to the 2005 proxy season. Putnam will consider as part of its review the
possibility of disclosingpotential conflicts of interests at companies with which
it has a business relationship.4
The release also notes that Putnam's announced review came in the wake of our
study. 5 We hope that this will set a pattern in the industry. Additionally, we will
also be including mutual funds in our annual survey that already includes the investment managers of pension funds. I think it is an important start.
JOHN OLSON: Mike, this is a great start for us. Let's now turn the microphone
over to Pat McGurn and Henry Hopkins. They are going to talk about how voting
decisions are actually made in this new fishbowl environment. Voting policies and
voting decisions have to be reported. Public employee and labor union pension
funds and others are paying attention to how funds vote, and perhaps even making
decisions about who to use as a manager for their retirement plans, based at least in
part on the policies fund managers follow in voting shares of investee companies.
PAT McGURN: I want to give you the 20,000-foot view of corporate-governance
activism or corporate-governance and proxy-voting activity by mutual funds. I
think it is good to break it down into "before vote disclosure" and "after vote disclosure." I think there is a myth out there that somehow mutual funds were not voting
their proxies or were not taking corporate-governance matters seriously before the
vote-disclosure rules came into play. I can tell you, based upon twenty years of
experience working in this industry, first at IRRC and now at ISS, that mutual
funds were some of the initial clients of our services. They came in and got this
research, analysis, and in the case of ISS, recommendations, long before a lot of
other fiduciaries came into play. It was not until the sudden foisting upon them of
fiduciary standards by the SEC, as part of this vote-disclosure package, that they
began to take proxy voting seriously.
I think the best way you can give an overall view of mutual fund activism is to
use Bob Pozen's words. He wrote a fairly famous new piece in the HarvardBusiness
Review a number of years ago where he called mutual funds "The Reluctant Activists."1 6 I think the title actually works well when you look at mutual funds as a
category of institutional activists, from our experience. By and large, there has been
activism by mutual funds, you just haven't seen it in public, for the most part, and
you haven't heard about it. It tends to take place behind closed doors, and it tends
to have a significant amount of influence.
14. Press Release, California State Treasurer Phil Angelides, California Treasurer Angelides, CalPERS,
CaISTRS Join CEO of Putnam Investments to Announce Putnam's Commitment to Broad, New Array of
Protections and Disclosures for Mutual Fund Investors, Financial Advisors 2 (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.
treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2004/092304_putnam.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Robert C. Pozen, InstitutionalInvestors: The Reluctant Activists, HARv. Bus. REv. 140 (Jan-Feb. 1994).
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Here are a couple basic things that have come up in earlier panels but need to be
taken into consideration here. Mutual funds do view exit as a corporate-governance
strategy by denying capital. Especially if you have a large stake, pulling it out of a
company when you do not like the performance can change the governance structure. You may end up costing a CEO's job, or you may cost the company a great
deal of marketing as a result of those large shifts in capital. I think that continues
today. Although used less than in the past, some of the funds continue to view the
Wall Street walk as a way to change behavior, more so than other investors do
today. While I think that is changing a little bit, it is still active today.
Mutual funds were the pioneers of what today are called "just vote no" strategies.
These are the efforts by institutional investors to withhold voting authority for
members of boards of directors. I know mutual fund managers who were using
their votes on the board as means of communication of their displeasure, particularly on performance issues, long before the public funds, the labor funds, and the
others even thought about doing so. You did not see this coming into public play,
first of all, because vote results were not made public before the early '90s when the
SEC changed the disclosure rules. Even for the first couple of years when those
rules were in play as to vote disclosure, you started seeing some numbers trickling
in at companies where there were no active issues or other solicitations going on
for "no vote" campaigns. Quite often these were individual managers exercising
their right to indicate their displeasure with performance or other issues through
their votes on boards of directors. Those votes typically were followed up by behind-the-scenes communications in which the manager and others would use the
high levels of access that their stake provided to push for change.
JOHN OLSON: I can remember a situation about twenty years ago when a client of
mine saw first hand that kind of activism. The client's CEO got a call from no less
than Ned Johnson, the chairman of Fidelity, who said, "We are not very happy with
your company's performance. We think you ought to consider a change-of-control
transaction. Here are some people you ought to talk to. Let me know when you
have retained an investment banker." Lo and behold, within six months the company had been sold at a very substantial premium over market. That was real shareholder activism.
PAT McGURN: It is the purest form of shareholder activism in that it was based
upon trying to improve performance directly; that sort of activism has been going
on forever. You do not hear about it because they typically do not run out in the
street at that point in time and say, "We were the institution that went after this
particular management team or after this particular board." As a result, it is very
hard to quantify, and it is impossible, frankly, for people like Lucian to see that
going on because you are not going to see it reflected in that activity. They are less
likely, and have traditionally been less likely, to support shareholder resolutions on
a broad panoply of topics.
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I think that has changed in the vote disclosure regime. They have generally been
much more likely to support management and, in particular, active mutual fund
management. We have heard this refrain for years when we have talked with mutual
funds about their guidelines. They tend to make a conscious decision to invest in a
company where they like the board, where they like the management, where they
like the strategy of the company's following. When they do not like the direction,
they tend to sell out of the security and exercise the option to exit. They are much
more likely than other institutions to act with the general intention of supporting
management because they believe in what they are doing.
To give you some physical descriptions of how they operate, we have more than
1,000 institutional clients today, and a significant number of them are long-term
clients as mutual fund complexes. We followed these firms through their evolution,
in many instances from being privately owned now to being publicly owned or
acquired by larger financial services conglomerates. I can tell you that by and large,
their activities and the structures they have in this area have tended to be fairly
consistent throughout that evolutionary process, at least as far as we can see it.
They tend to be the same in the way that all cars are the same-in other words,
they are not. There are certain similarities and activities, but by and large, it is not
surprising to see the high level of fluctuation in Mike's study on those votes because
that reflects the broader community of what we have seen. Most of them do have
proxy committees, but most of these proxy committees typically have been in the
investment adviser area. It has been only over the last couple of years that we have
seen the mutual fund boards themselves getting much more involved in the process
of coming up with what the policies were going to be as far as proxy voting for
those funds. I think that is an evolution we are going to see more and more of now
that the process has to be disclosed in the public marketplace. I think that has
gotten more boards asking about this process.
Individual portfolio managers-read fund managers-are much more participatory in the voting process than a lot of other institutional clients, and in a lot
of other areas. Money-management firms, for example, tend to take all the proxyvoting activities and centralize them. Some mutual fund complexes do that as well,
but a lot of them still basically maintain different policies that reflect the investment policies at the various firms within their complex. They have traditionally
been the institutional group most likely to vote outside their proxy-voting guidelines. They have been more willing, after going through discussions with corporate
managements, to end up changing their votes. Where their guidelines would have
said they would not support management, they would change to supporting management after those discussions.
I have been involved behind the scenes in a lot of those discussions, and they are
not typically driven by anything even close to a conflict of interest. Quite often they
were able to get not only additional information, but also further concessions out
of corporate managements and out of boards, which gave them a higher degree of
VOL. 1 NO. 1 2006
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comfort in voting outside their guidelines in supporting management. There is a
phenomenon known as "side letters," and these are letters that corporate boards of
directors and/or corporate managements, CEOs in particular, provide to these
funds. They spell out the reforms they have agreed to make to their stock plans, to
their board independence, to other issues, and to their corporate strategy, which
they deliver directly to those institutions. Typically those are not made public. We
tend to track them indirectly because we know the MOs of various mutual fund
complexes, so we can see when their fingers are on a particular reform that a company has adopted. It has been an interesting phenomenon.
That last thing I talked about is gone today; we do not see mutual funds voting
outside the four corners of their guidelines anymore. It used to be that they were
the most likely to do it. I would say that two or three years from now they are going
to be the least likely to do it because of the scrutiny they get if they vote outside
their guidelines in this vote-disclosure regime. I think the reluctance side of the
activism, because of vote disclosure, is going to be over. There is going to be more
pressure on mutual fund complexes to get much more involved in these issues.
There is going to be much greater oversight. And I think a marketing element will
come into play as well, as to whether they are supporting the interests of the investors and their funds. Some mutual funds, especially some of those involved in the
scandals over the last twelve months, appear to be getting much more aggressive in
their corporate-governance policies. We have sat down with a number of them and
helped them revise their proxy-voting policies that we apply for them quite often
by our agency-voting business. They are getting much more aggressive in this votedisclosure environment than they ever have been before.
JOHN OLSON: One of the services you offer your issuer clients, your company
clients, is for them to come in and pay you to analyze their proposal, tell them what
kind of support it will get, and whether it meets your guidelines.
PAT McGURN: Actually, we do not tell them. We just tell them the tools that
allow them to figure out whether it is going to pass muster under our guidelines.
We do not tell them whether our clients are likely to support it or not.
JOHN OLSON: Do you think we are going to see more consultation, in advance of
proposals being made by company managements, with mutual funds that are large
investors in the company?
PAT McGURN: The votes are closer, John, and so we are seeing people going out
on road shows in advance of putting a controversial proposal in place. Much more
often they test the waters; that is something they can do under the federal proxy
rules. I think we are seeing more of it, and we will see more of it in the future. We
are also seeing greater numbers of road shows where people have to go out and sell
their proposals retail. It is just more difficult getting people to buy off on them at
that point.
HENRY HOPKINS: YOU indicated that there is less overriding of the guidelines
adopted by the committees. Presumably that is because they simply do not want to
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS
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have to then justify the overriding, because now it is public. One could argue that
what is happening is that portfolio managers are being dissuaded from exercising
their best judgment because of the ramifications if they were to go against the
guidelines; specifically, they would be subject to criticism. That is not necessarily a
positive outcome.
PAT McGURN: I think there has been a beneficial effect of the types of mutual
fund activism we have seen in the past, the behind-the-scenes activities, the side
letters, and so forth. I think the benefits that were provided by those activities are
going to dissipate over time. I think it is being replaced, frankly, by simply a greater
knowledge in corporate boardrooms that mutual funds are unlikely to vote outside
their guidelines. So they have to go out in advance and find out what those policies
are, how they are likely to support a program, and design the program up front to
meet those concerns.
JOHN OLSON: That is certainly what I am seeing in my practice.
PAT McGURN: It is a tradeoff. I think you are right that in some instances. Unfortunately, portfolio managers have been clearly dissuaded from doing things they
might have felt were the right things to do because they were concerned that, in
hindsight, somebody would look at those votes and say, "Oh, conflict of interest."
Look, you run their 401(k) plan, your guidelines said this, you voted that way, and
so, it is sad.
JOHN OLSON: Let me just ask a question of Henry, both because I want to give
him a chance to say some things and also I want to learn this. Henry is the chief
legal counsel, the person who coordinates this process for T. Rowe Price. How do
you develop your guidelines? Who gets to decide, and how do you make changes
from time to time?
HENRY HOPKINS: At T. Rowe Price there is a proxy committee. It is composed of
a broad cross-section of professionals. It includes a representative of a legal department, Darrell Braman, but its investment personnel established the general policies.
We have had this process in place virtually ever since I have been at the firm, which
is quite a few years. The committee has evolved and changed over time, but basically it is pretty much the same structure.
JOHN OLSON: Is it the same set of guidelines for every fund no matter whether
they are a sector fund or a growth fund or a value fund?
HENRY HOPKINS: We have basically firm guidelines, which go across the board.
JOHN OLSON: Can a manager come in and say, "Gee, those guidelines just don't
make sense for my fund because everybody in my industry is doing such and such?"
HENRY HOPKINS: Bottom line, we place the full responsibility of voting individual separate accounts and mutual funds on the portfolio manager who is primarily
responsible for that fund or account. The buck stops with them, and the reason is
that they are responsible for the performance of that fund. Every mutual fund has
an advisory committee, which is responsible for the management of that fund as
well as the voting of the proxies for all the portfolio companies within that fund's
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list of holdings. That portfolio manager can override and vote contrary to the
firm's general policy. But they must document the reasons for their vote, and the
committee reviews all such circumstances where a policy has been overridden by
the portfolio manager.
JOHN OLSON: Do the folks who provide retirement-plan management services, T.
Rowe Price Trust Company, have any role in making these decisions?
HENRY HOPKINS: That is a very important point, which I believe deserves a full

airing. A statement was made earlier that mutual funds act as rubber stamps of
corporate America. Now, I do not know what basis there is to justify and substantiate such a statement. I think it is a wholly erroneous statement. The facts are very
clear: If you analyze every account at T. Rowe Price and virtually every other account at other federal advisers, there is a portfolio manager who is responsible for
that account. That person's compensation is going to depend on the performance
of the accounts he or she manages. Our portfolio managers certainly do not act as a
rubber stamp for anyone, whether it be corporate America or whether it be trying
to protect our 401(k) recordkeeping relationship at that firm. The portfolio manager has his or her self-interest at heart. They want to get the best performance out
of their fund, and they are going to do everything they can within legal constraints
to achieve and earn good performance. There is absolutely no interconnection between our 401(k) business recordkeeping or, for that matter, our investment advisory business, and the voting of portfolio proxies.
It was mentioned earlier that we scored only fifty-eight percent and that we were
going to be contacted about, I presume, our low score. Let me make this very clear:
We would not entertain any change in our policy because of pressure from a client
wanting us to change our policy to conform to their own policy. What you are
proposing is exactly what we are worried about, namely, attempts by special interests to influence our investment personnel to change their votes for other than pure
investment reasons.
JOHN

OLSON: Do you want to respond to Mike?

For the fiduciaries of 401(k) plans, as with defined-benefit
pension plans, there is a duty to monitor the performance of their investment managers. Proxy votes are considered plan assets. As part of that review, it is appropriate and consistent with their duties to discuss the proxy-voting performance with
their investment managers. It is one of the factors that they may take into consideration in evaluating that relationship. I think it is appropriate for the trustees of
such funds to talk about that with T. Rowe Price and other managers.
JOHN OLSON: But be careful, because there are fiduciaries all over the place. One
of the problems ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act]" 7 fiduciaries
have is that they have to be careful that they are not using the assets of their penHENRY HOPKINS:

17. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1461 (2000)),
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sioners and prospective pensioners to promote a noninvestment agenda. This criticism was made of the campaign against Safeway, which was thought by some
commentators to be related to a labor-organizing effort as much as to investment
objectives. There are interesting conflicts all over the place. When we talk about a
mutual fund complex, when we talk about corporate or union pension funds, there
may be conflicts of policy between investment objectives and other objectives.
HENRY HOPKINS: I would like to make another distinction: between clients and
shareholders. At T. Rowe Price, ever since I can remember, we have annually provided a full report of our specific voting on all portfolio companies to the price
funds. That report is made to the boards. The boards are, in fact, our client, not the
funds' shareholders. It is interesting to note that now, through the SEC rule, which
we were very much opposed to, we will now have to make the report not only to
the board, but also to all shareholders. The stated reason for this new disclosure
rule is that, in the SEC's view, shareholders should be able to understand and evaluate a mutual fund's investment advisory voting record in order to determine
whether they wish to purchase the fund or to continue as a shareholder. I will say
that the interests of shareholders in this area have been and continue to be so
minute that you have to question the cost benefit. We have monitored very carefully the inquiries we receive, and they are few and far between.
JOHN OLSON: It might be different for closed-end funds. Does T. Rowe Price
manage any closed-end funds?
HENRY HOPKINS: No, we don't.
JOHN OLSON: OK, so if you have an open-end, widely-held liquid fund, I suppose the Wall Street rule really does work: if you do not like what they are doing,
you just buy a different fund.
HENRY HOPKINS: I might also say that the fifty-eight-percent score would indicate that Price was not at the level we would want. Nevertheless, suppose I am a
shareholder and someone says, "We're going to give you two ratings: One is the
investment performance; the other is the voting performance." I think the more
important gauge is performance, not your voting record. I can tell you that it is
very difficult for most shareholders to fully understand all the intricacies of voting
and all the issues. That does not mean that if they want to study our record they
should not be allowed to do so. From my perspective, however, I think the disclosure of votes annually has been a very significant and costly exercise, which is not
going to attain what the SEC has assumed would be achieved. The fact is that the
boards are the ones that should be evaluating the advisers' ability to vote the fund
shares. Shareholders are not the governance body for the fund; the board is.
JOHN OLSON: It goes to the theory of what a fund is: Is it an investment, like a
business corporation? Or is it really a product produced by a manager, which you
can buy and sell and market?
HENRY HOPKINS: You just asked the right question, and I think it is one that has
been completely obfuscated during many of the discussions today. When a person
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buys a T. Rowe Price fund, are they buying a T. Rowe Price fund or a fund on
whose board serve specific independent directors? I believe that there is little question that they are buying the fund because it is managed by T. Rowe Price and do
not give any consideration to who the independent directors are. Investors buy our
funds and expect T. Rowe Price to manage the product and provide consistent and
long-term good performance.
JOHN OLSON: That is really an issue for another day. It is a very interesting issue
to me and to the scholars. Does our whole system of 1940 Act"8 regulation make
any sense when we are talking about what is really a financial product that competes with various kinds of insurance products and other sorts of retirement products? The '40 Act is there, though, and it says that the fund directors are fiduciaries
for the people that buy and sell this product. 9 Have any of your independent fund
directors, the fiduciaries for this "product," ever pushed back when they got a report and said, "We don't like this" or "You ought to change that," as far as you can
recall?
HENRY HOPKINS: I think we have had very in-depth discussions on various issues. I do not remember an instance where the board decided to instruct us to vote
in a manner different than we have. You have to understand that the board has
selected the adviser not only to make the investments and to monitor the investments, but also to vote proxies in a manner we deem to be in the best interest of
the fund. If directors start second-guessing or overriding the investment adviser, it
is self-defeating. I think whenever you get a board, whether it be a board of a
school or college that begins to get involved in the daily management of the organization, you have a problem, because the management should be the responsibility
of management and not the board. If the board does not feel that management is
doing an adequate job, then it may be time for the board to change management,
but not take over the management itself. I feel that many of the changes that have
taken place recently are, unfortunately, forcing boards into making management
decisions to a greater extent than is healthy.
JOHN OLSON: How should these financial products be managed?
PAT MCGURN: I guess the scrutiny of the voting-disclosure voting data has just
begun. In demand from, frankly, a lot of our mutual fund clients, we have put
together a new product for them where we have databased the N-PX filings.2° We
are aiming toward the top 200 complexes, and we have already got about two million votes in that database-two million distinct votes that have not been cast. The
interesting thing about that product is that it has been mutual fund advisers themselves who are buying it, not the boards of the mutual funds. For the first time I
think they are looking at this as a competitive issue: What are other funds doing in
18. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a1-80a-64 (2000)).
19. Id. § 80a-35.
20. 17 C.F.R. 274.129 (2005).
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this regard? How do we act vis-A-vis that? What is the perception of the marketplace going to be? It is interesting, because people have said we have not had many
requests from our own holders for this information. I think the primary users of
this information right now are some of the mutual fund management firms themselves, which are benchmarking themselves against peers on that basis for the first
time.
HENRY HOPKINS: Can I just give a broad perspective on one issue? When I entered into the mutual fund business in 1972, we generally did not vote the securities
of our separate accounts; they were voted by the clients themselves. Subsequently,
the Department of Labor and the SEC came out with new pronouncements that
said the voting of proxies is part of the investment process. Consequently, advisers
were pressured to take over that function. At one time the fund officers voted our
fund proxies, not the adviser, but again, that has now been switched to the adviser.
Mutual funds, by and large, have been passive investors. It is not in the interest of
the funds and their shareholders for portfolio managers and security analysts to
start trying to manage or influence their portfolio companies. When that occurs
they lose their objectivity. Losing objectivity leads to bad investment decisions. I
think there is a double-edged sword. We have to perform our corporate and shareholder duty to vote proxies, as any good corporate citizen. At the same time, I
caution fund groups trying to encourage their portfolio managers to get involved in
the management of their portfolio companies, because if they do that, they will not
have time to make investment decisions.
JOHN OLSON: If they go too far, they will be business-development companies.
[laughter]
TIM FORDE: Michael said something earlier in connection with Henry that I
thought was very interesting. He very thoughtfully described the responsibilities
that the AFL-CIO has in connection with its relationship with T. Rowe and other
investment managers and its defined-benefit plan. I am not a pension lawyer, but
as I understand the duties and responsibilities there, I thought that was a highly
accurate description of what the various duties and responsibilities are in that relationship. That said, a report from T. Rowe Price or any other investment manager
to the Office of Investment at the AFL-CIO or the board or senior management at
the AFL-CIO, is very different from a report card issued publicly, with ten selfselected items, and public grades for whether or not major investment managers
are taking significant actions in support of their shareholders' interest in progressive governance practices at portfolio companies. Those are, to me, completely different things.
Look at the grading system the AFL-CIO has developed, just look at one particular issue: expensing of stock options. I am a very strong supporter of expensing
stock options. I got my head handed to me by John and a number of other people
when I was on the Hill in 1994 and 1995 and was on the House side. Along with
[Congressman Edward] Markey, [Congressman] John Dingell, and [former SEC
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Chairman] Arthur Levitt, we worked hundreds of hours on what we thought was
very clever correspondence trying to find a way for the SEC to support the FASB
[Financial Accounting Standards Board] and not let them get run over at the time,
and it did not work. They did get run over, but that issue came back. I personally
feel very strongly about it, and I think it is a wonderful thing. I am very proud that
the Investment Company Institute endorsed expensing of stock options two years
ago, and we have written very strong follow-up letters after that.
Not every one of our members agrees with that. I say that because the AFL-CIO
has listed this as an unarguable proposition. The expensing of stock options is
simply not subject to debate. Your position with respect to a shareholder proposal
at a particular company is a litmus test: Whatever the percentage is, it will be determined, at least according to this report, on the basis of your view on that issue. I
think this is a distressing tendency in Washington that we have seen grow year by
year where special-interest groups of every stripe, every place in the political spectrum, are defining their own ways of evaluating political conduct in Washington.
Then they are defining the standards and issuing the grades. They are the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury, and then they go and push it out to the media. I do not
think this is really ultimately beneficial. I certainly respect and understand the need
to simplify complicated issues in a whole range of places in our life, but I do not
necessarily think this is a way to do that.
I think Pat gave a compelling description of the year's worth of actions, very
quiet actions that not a whole lot of people know about, in which mutual fund
companies and leaders were in very prominent positions that protected and advanced shareholder interest. By no means am I saying all mutual fund leaders have
done that; I am not saying that there are not fund companies and fund leaders that
are not doing as good a job as they could be and should be. I am questioning the
standards that are used to reach that determination and the instances in which it is
being done.
That said, stepping back, two of the areas in the world of mutual funds that I am
most excited about over the long term are corporate governance and market-structure reform (stock exchange trading systems reforms). These are two areas where
we might not agree on how we define the issues and the resolution of all of those
issues, but they are two extremely important areas where the interests of funds,
fund advisers, and their shareholders can and should line up very well. It is an
opportunity, either by reducing trading cost and creating more transparent, more
efficient, more effective trading systems, or on the corporate-governance side, by
supporting and promoting policies that we think have a reasonable probability of
producing and adding value to companies in which fund managers choose to invest. Those are marvelous things, they both serve mutual fund shareholder interest
tremendously. I think it is a very exciting thing and obviously we have a lot of
issues within mutual funds, within the operation and management of mutual funds

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

THE

$7

TRILLION QUESTION

and the fund companies that we are focused on right now, but these are exciting
possibilities for us in the future.
JOHN OLSON: While you have the floor, Tim, what is the ICI's view of additional
regulatory initiatives, additional efforts encouraging activism by mutual funds in
this area? Do you think we have enough for now? Do you think the shareholderaccess rule is a good idea or a bad idea? Do you have a position on whether more
ought to be done?
TIM FORDE: That is a good question. The Institute has expressed support for the
shareholder-access rule, although it was modest support. Obviously there is a lot of
work that has gone on at the Commission to try to develop a compromise that the
business community thinks it could live with. I have not been following that day by
day; we have a lot of things going on inside of funds that have kept us busy recently. I do not see, quite frankly, a list of essential regulatory proposals in front of
me that I think are necessary in order to strengthen the hands of institutional
investors, not now. Since Enron, we have all sorts of accounting proposals. We
strongly supported many of them and thought they were marvelous things. We
regret that it took Enron and WorldCom and others to produce benefits in one year
after being fought for for more than ten. It was a very good thing. I do not see
anything immediately on the horizon that I think is the next big battle for us.
Obviously you guys have your hands full with [SEC Chairman William H.] Donaldson's proposal, so I guess I will leave it there.
MICHAEL GARLAND: I am not surprised that representatives of the industry that
fought the rule are now concerned about people taking the information that is now
available and trying to help shareholders interpret it. It would be unfair to say that
we are holding ourselves up as judge and jury. We looked at twelve votes. What we
did was very transparent. A lot of other groups are going to be looking at these
votes as well. Mutual fund shareholders and trustees of funds can interpret the
information as they will, so we see this as an important tool.
With respect to the comment earlier about rubber stamps, before the disclosure
rule requiring guidelines and votes to be disclosed, we were able to collect guidelines
from some mutual fund complexes. Most of those guidelines said, "The fund votes
with management in all cases except . . ." and then there were some delineated
exceptions. Some were significant, but generally it was embedded in the guidelines
that the fund would support management. In addition, since disclosure, you have
seen more elaborate guidelines. Funds have to disclose their guidelines, and more
importantly, you have seen an upward trend in the votes on proposals; there have
been more majority votes. I do think that sunlight has proved to be a disinfectant,
and I would hope that other investor groups also will be using this information.
JOHN OLSON: We can go back and forth on this. I suspect that part of Henry's
answer would be that what fund managers do is pick good management, and that is
why they tend to want to back them; otherwise they ought not to make the investment. But I am not going to give him a chance to say that. [laughter]
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MICHAEL GARLAND: Voting against management on a specific proposal with respect to expensing options or something else is not an indictment of that management. Also, the Wall Street walk (i.e., selling companies with poor management) is
not a viable option for many investors, including the many pension funds that
invest through low-cost, broadly diversified index funds.
TIM FORDE: I have thought of one thing on the horizon that I think we support.
First of all, we are committed to implementing the letter and the spirit of the
proxy-vote disclosure rule. We are not fighting it, and we are not resisting it, and
we are trying to help our members with it.
I agree with Michael; others are going to do these kinds of things. I think that
self-selection is what it is. The GAO recently issued a report saying that proxy-vote
disclosure should be extended to other institutional investors." And Senator [Edward M.] Kennedy has picked up on that report and sent it to the Labor Department, I believe, and a couple of others. Our having made peace with where we are
and what our members are being required to do, one of our major objections was
that we lost confidential voting. We are the only institutional investor now that has
lost the value of confidential voting. The AFL-CIO has, in numerous instances, put
shareholder proposals on the ballot to get confidential voting.
MICHAEL GARLAND: That is an inaccurate representation of what confidential
voting is. Confidential voting is the disclosure of a vote before the meeting.
JOHN OLSON: Well, that will be interesting. There is also a Business Roundtable
petition to get the SEC to look at the whole question of how shareholders are
communicated through street name holders and the like.
HENRY HOPKINS: Is there anything the Roundtable is not petitioning these days,
John? [laughter]
JOHN OLSON: That is the only one I know of that is pending from the Roundtable. Now we are going to hear from someone who has done vigorous academic
research in this area. We have the pleasure of having Lucian Bebchuk share some of
his conclusions with us.
LUCIAN BEBCHUK: As I see it, when we think about the effect of mutual funds
and corporate governance there are two questions. One question is whether they
have proper incentives. I think Jack Bogle was quite right today in stressing that we
have problems on that front. Michael continued on that line. I think that fundamental reform for corporate governance would have to go in that direction. Taking
the existing systems of incentives as given, the question is, Can we improve? Are
there any things we can do? What kind of tools do they have when institutional
investors do take an interest in how much of an effect they can have on
management?

21.
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The institutions are reluctant activists, but sometimes they do vote against management to overcome some tendency they have to go alone. On some issues where
they think the position is very clear and the stakes are significant, they do vote
systematically against management. What I want to do is to show you some evidence as to how much effect this has.
To start, I think it is time for us to recognize that, as an instrument of corporate
governance, the Wall Street rule is far overrated. Why? Because in the basic
problems of corporate governance the Wall Street rule cannot really have any effect.
Suppose that you have a company where, with good governance, the share price
would be $150. Right now management is underperforming, everybody recognizes
it, and the market price is $100. If a mutual fund sells on the market, takes the Wall
Street rule, it is not going to get the $150. It is unhappy about having $100 rather
than $150. It can sell on the market to somebody else who will pay $100, who will
have $100, and it will be passing along the company with, unfortunately, too low a
price to somebody else. This would not allow either institutional investors or the
corporate economy to capture the extra fifty dollars we could have with better
governance. We need something other than the Wall Street rule.
Now, the example I wanted to look at is staggered boards. Why are staggered
boards instructive? Because they are an issue about which institutional investors,
across the board, have a very clearly registered view.22 As you know, mutual funds
are reluctant to vote with shareholder activists on many precatory resolutions. But
one type of precatory resolution that they generally vote-and increasingly vote
against incumbents-is staggered boards. For several years now precatory resolutions to repeated staggered boards have been receiving majority support. If you
look at the empirical evidence from studies that colleagues and I conducted, you
find that staggered boards are associated with a three- to four-percent reduction in
firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q. 3 Looking only at hostile bid targets, the
presence of a staggered board doubles the likelihood of remaining independent,
which turns out to be a very bad thing for shareholders. Shareholders of targets
with staggered boards that remain independent suffer very large financial losses
compared with the bid price, even if you look two and a half years down the road.
So, we have those resolutions, and we have this clearly registered shareholder
support for getting rid of staggered boards, but what is the outcome? Documenting
the outcome of precatory resolutions over the 1995 to 2003 period, 136 precatory
resolutions passed with majority support to get rid of a staggered board.24 Of that
22. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 835, 836,
853-61 (2005). The numbers referred to in the following paragraphs are from Prof. Bebchuk's working version
of the article.
23. "Q is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets." Lucian Bebchuk et al.,
What Matters in CorporateGovernance? 16 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/
papers/pdf/Bebchuk-et%20al_491.pdf.
24. See Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 853.
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number, ninety-five still had a staggered board in place as of fall 2004. Perhaps
those were expressions of short-term sentiments and the board was proven correct
after a year, as was the case in some circumstances. But if we look at the situations
in which there was repeat passage of such resolutions, you see that nineteen out of
those twenty-four companies still have a staggered board by 2004. This is true even
if you look at companies where resolutions were passed three or more times. At
Eastman Kodak, for example, resolutions were passed in 1997, 1998, 1999, and
2000.2 At this point people give up.
MALE SPEAKER: Sometimes people pay a price, though. I see that Federated Department Stores passed the precatory resolution three times, and they drew in excess of sixty-percent withhold vote for their entire board of directors because a
number of institutions conducted a withhold campaign there this year. If the SEC's
proxy-access rule were in effect for next proxy season and keyed back to last season,
Federated, like Disney, would probably actually do something about it then, too.
LUCIAN BEBCHUK: What we see here is it says nine out of fifteen, so it means that
there is some effect. 6
MALE SPEAKER: They have not changed yet, but as Pat says, they might.
LUCIAN BEBCHUK: Right, it suggests that there is some effect because of the various channels that still exist. I think the numbers here are larger than most people
would expect. They are actually larger than we expected when we started putting
them together. We did not expect these results in the face of such stable repeated
expression of shorter sentiment that exists.
A staggered-board situation is also a good test of the installation of boards based
primarily on shareholder desire and sentiment. This afternoon there was discussion
of the possibility that there may be some back channels, that there may be some
informal shareholder discussions. Sometimes we have shareholders getting their
way, not through a precatory resolution being implemented, but by making those
informal codes. That does not present a problem for analyzing the staggered-board
studies simply because we know all the cases in which companies repealed staggered boards from 1995 to 2003, and there are very few instances. Thus, when we
put things together, we see that shareholder votes against staggered boards did not
have an effect. It is having a slightly larger effect in 2004 because of the changed
climate.
PAT McGURN: There is a larger picture, though. We have seen more than sixty
companies repeal their classified board structures during this year alone. There is a
collateral effect you see when companies fear that they are going to get a majority
vote; they end up taking action or they fear the possibility that something might
trigger ballot access down the line. I think you do have to look at the broader
picture a little bit.

25.
26.

Id. at 855.
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LUCIAN BEBCHUK: After 2003, what I showed you is the full picture. There is a

question of whether what is happening is going to suggest a complete sea change.
Until 2003, however, there was not a large number of companies that were responding to informal pressure in repeating staggered boards, outside of those in
the table. 27 After 2003, what we had was very clearly registered shareholder opposition to staggered boards.
PAT McGURN: What we had was the specter of ballot acts coming into play.
Boards feared that there would be substantial withhold votes in response to the
majority votes, which would potentially result in being displanted from the board
of directors. That is what has changed since 2003.
JOHN OLSON:

What do you conclude, Lucian?
In order to make boards more accountable, one might want

LUCIAN BEBCHUK:

to influence boards less and give shareholders more power. Part is conjecture, just
the specter of shareholder access and, perhaps, the new instrument of withhold
vote is going to have an effect. I think that withhold votes are not as consequential
as many of us would hope. Think about the Disney example, the most celebrated
case of a withhold campaign. We had more than forty percent of the shareholders
withhold their votes from Eisner, and Eisner is still around. He is saying that he will
leave in 2006, but two and a half more years is not something that people take for
granted in many systems.
PAT McGURN: The vote was about the chairmanship, and he gave up the chairmanship immediately. The board stripped him of that title, and that is what a lot of
investors voted on. How could you say that did not have an effect?
LUCIAN BEBCHUK: I think that it would be fair to say that the effect was somewhat limited. I think that if you read what the papers said after that, it was clearly
understood as a powerful no-confidence vote against Eisner. It was viewed as an
unprecedented, massive revolt of shareholders against the existing team at Disney,
which was the result of a combination of circumstances in the face of very substantial impediments. This massive revolt occurred, and the consequences are limited.
Having George J. Mitchell become chairman after facing a twenty-four-percent
withhold vote himself also emphasizes that this is not a great example of a board's
complete responsiveness to shareholders.
I think that there are generally two things that give shareholders somewhat
weaker rights. One is the power shareholders have to replace the board. This is
something that has received a lot of attention in connection with shareholder access
and related reforms that I support. Second, shareholders do not have the power to
adopt changes to basic governance arrangements, regardless of how long-standing,
stable, and strong shareholder support might be. Shareholders do not have the
power to initiate a charter amendment or a change in the state of incorporation.
Management has a monopoly over anything that changes corporate governance.

27.
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This suggests to me that we have a problem with the evolution of corporate-governance arrangements.

The one place where shareholders obviously have power is at the IPO stage. If
you look at when companies went public, however, you will find that a majority of
U.S. stock market capitalization went public before 1980, with more than one-third
doing so before 1950. If the initial charter was adopted way back, basically any
change in governance arrangements since that point could have taken place only if
management was in its favor.
One reform that I advocate would give shareholders the power to initiate, and
adopt by vote, changes in some constitutional arrangements under some circumstances. Additionally, this reform would invigorate elections. If one is concerned
about shareholders' acting as a result of short-term circumstances and not having a
sufficient long-term horizon, one could have a rule under which shareholders
would be able to change the rules only if there were a vote in favor in two successive
annual meetings. In a situation like the one we had in Eastman Kodak, for example,
if shareholders prefer to change the rules of the game over four annual meetings,
they would be able to do so. This one reform would be able, in one stroke, to
improve governance arrangements on many other issues. We would then be able to
have shareholders themselves adopt improvements to governance arrangements,
rather than accepting changes in a one-size-fits-all manner. Shareholders would be
able to adopt a charter amendment that requires option expensing or takes this or
that position. The potential benefits from better governance arrangements are
significant.
In a forthcoming paper titled What Matters in Corporate Governance?,2" we find
that one can identify six corporate-governance provisions that, both individually
and in the aggregate, correlate with lower firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q,
and with lower returns over a long period of time. Those six bedfellows are (i)
staggered boards, (ii) limits on charter amendments, (iii) supermajority provisions
for mergers, (iv) supermajority provisions for charter amendments, (v) golden
parachutes, and (vi) poison pills. All six are associated with a higher level of entrenchment for a company, and that is why we put them together in the form of an
entrenchment index. When we run regressions, we find that even when we control
for many other governance provisions, there are six provisions that have very
strong negative correlations; other things matter little. Moreover, if you take this
entrenchment index and you look at the firm that is called "the best," you can see
that over the thirteen-year period from 1990 to 2003 the best firms had lower levels
of entrenchment and risk adjustment. Even if you just compare the top half versus
the bottom half, there is still an excess return of more than 2.5% a year.
JOHN OLSON: Thank you very much, Lucian. Let's thank our speakers, and we
will take a break.
28.

See Bebchuk, supra note 23.
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